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Sander: Mismatch and The Empirical Scholars Brief

MISMATCH AND THE EMPIRICAL SCHOLARS
BRIEF
Richard Sander*
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2013, the Valparaiso University Law Review held a
symposium on diversity in legal education, commemorating the
contributions of Justice Randall Shepard and featuring a number of
distinguished speakers.1 I was invited to participate in a panel on Fisher
v. University of Texas, a then-pending Supreme Court case that seemed
likely to revise the rules under which universities can consider race in
higher education admissions. The conference organizers generously
allowed me to participate by videoconference, as did my co-panelist
Professor Eboni Nelson. They and I agreed that my talk should explore
some of the empirical issues that might frame how the Supreme Court
viewed Fisher.
I approached the event with some concern. I had been the bête noire
of many diversity advocates ever since 2005, when the Stanford Law
Review published my long analysis and critique of law school affirmative
action programs.2 I had advanced, and since steadfastly defended,
something called “the mismatch hypothesis,” which postulated that very
large preferences—racial or of any other kind—may undermine student
learning, because professors tend to teach to the middle of their class,
and students far below the middle will have trouble keeping up and
advancing as concepts build day by day.3 Critiques of my essay had
been many, but I had answered them, and an increasingly broad array of
other scholars had published articles that found other strong evidence of
mismatch in a wide variety of academic contexts.4 Certainly, the
evidence for mismatch was mixed—at least in some contexts—and social
Professor of Law, UCLA; Ph.D. (economics) Northwestern University.
See generally Kevin Brown, Tribute to Randall Shepard, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 585 (2014)
(commemorating Justice Shepard); María Pabón López, The ICLEO Legacy of Chief Justice
Randall Shepard: An Essay, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 611 (2014) (discussing Justice Shepard’s
impact on the legal community through the ICLEO program); Michael Hunter Schwartz, 50
More Years of CLEO Scholars: The Past, the Present, and a Vision for the Future, 48 VAL. U. L.
REV. 621 (2014) (discussing the national CLEO and ICLEO programs and calling for a new
model in the future).
2
See generally Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American
Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004) (criticizing affirmative action programs and
explaining the effect racial preferences have on minorities).
3
See Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1966–78 (2005)
(explaining the mismatch hypothesis as it relates to affirmative action policies).
4
See id. at 1978–2014 (addressing criticisms advanced by Michele Dauber, Ian Ayres,
Richard Brooks, David Wilkins, and Chambers et al.).
*
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scientists who found evidence of mismatch never argued—to my
knowledge—that the existence of mismatch should preclude affirmative
action policies. But just as certainly, universities tended to completely
ignore the mismatch problem, and this was quite disturbing. The
Supreme Court’s decision to review the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Fisher—
and to thus reconsider the constitutionality of university racial
preferences—increased the level of interest and anxiety about mismatch
research.
Lawyer and journalist Stuart Taylor, Jr., had joined forces with me to
write a broadly accessible book on the effects of racial preferences, called
Mismatch, which appeared in October 2012.5 That, along with two briefs
that Stuart and I wrote as amici curiae to the Court on Fisher,6 helped to
elevate the mismatch hypothesis to a prominent place in the public
discussion of Fisher. The New York Times, The Economist, the Wall Street
Journal, and NPR’s All Things Considered all ran prominent articles on
mismatch, generally treating it as, at the very least, an idea to be
reckoned with seriously.7 The general tone was well-captured by The
New York Times’ David Brooks, who wrote: “[A]ffirmative action
programs . . . perpetrated some noteworthy wrongs . . . . The evidence on
this is hotly disputed, but Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor Jr. make a
compelling case . . . .”8
Yet at law school events during the 2012–2013 academic year, when I
was invited to speak about any aspect of Fisher, a strangely repetitive
pattern emerged. Regardless of whether the topic at hand was
See generally RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT
(2012).
6
See generally Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support
of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
[hereinafter Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Petitioner] (arguing that empirical
evidence calls for rethinking and clarifying the Court’s jurisprudence on racial
preferences); Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of
Neither Party, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Brief for Sander &
Taylor Supporting Neither Party] (suggesting that empirical evidence on the operation and
effects of racial preferences, and the absence of socioeconomic diversity, call for a
rethinking of the Court’s jurisprudence on racial preferences)..
7
E.g., Affirmative Action:
Unequal Protection, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2013),
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21576658-first-three-pieces-race-based-preferences;
All Things Considered: How Does Affirmative Action Impact Colleges?, NPR (Oct. 9, 2012),
www.npr.org/2012/10/09/162591214/how-does-affirmative-action-impact-colleges;
Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Unraveling of Affirmative Action, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13,
2012, 6:14 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904447999045780509
01460576218; Dan Slater, Does Affirmative Action Do What It Should?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/opinion/sunday/does-affirmative-actiondo-what-it-should.html?_r=0.
8
David Brooks, Speed of Ascent, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A21.
5
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mismatch, or some entirely different part of the affirmative action issue,
panel members who disliked my mismatch research would start to recite
from a document known as the “Empirical Scholars Brief.”9 This
document, they would suggest, was the definitive refutation of Richard
Sander, the other “mismatch” researchers, and all that we were taken to
represent. Often they would distribute copies of the Empirical Scholars
Brief to the audience, like revivalists passing out the Gospel of St. James.
But—and this was the oddest part—these panelists were never interested
in engaging or debating any of the claims that were actually in the
Empirical Scholars Brief (which I will sometimes, as shorthand, refer to
as the “ESB”). One panelist, at an AALS panel in a large ballroom,
disclaimed any intention of getting into the details. “I’m not a trained
quantitative empiricist,” she said, “instead I’m compelled to rely on
critiques by other empiricists.”10 Pretty much exactly the same thing
happened at the Valparaiso symposium.11 Professor Nelson began our
panel with a very thoughtful discussion of the “deference” issue—that is,
when and to what degree the Supreme Court should defer to the
educational judgment of universities in evaluating their diversity
programs.12 Professor Sumi Cho followed with some rather discursive
remarks on the importance of diversity. I then spoke about some of my
empirical findings on university behavior—a sort of empirical comment
on some of the same issues Professor Nelson had raised.13 When we
See generally Brief of Empirical Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Brief of Empirical Scholars] (arguing
against the mismatch hypothesis).
10
Angela I. Onwuachi-Willig, Univ. of Iowa Coll. of Law, 40 Years After Rodriguez, 35
Years After Bakke: Education, Equality and Fundamental Rights (Jan. 4, 2013) (transcript on
file with author).
11
This was particularly exasperating, since I had anticipated such a problem. I had
pointed out to the conference organizers that it was quite likely Professor Cho would
invoke the ESB or some other general critique of mismatch in her remarks, and they
therefore needed to schedule my remarks to come after Cho so that I had a fair opportunity
to respond. They provisionally agreed, and when Cho objected to speaking before me, the
law school administration became involved and ultimately gave Cho an ultimatum. But, as
the reader will see, this arrangement did not end up giving me a fair opportunity to
respond to Cho’s attack or to allow the participants in the symposium to hear a reasoned
debate on the issues.
12
For more information regarding Professor Nelson’s perspective, see Eboni S. Nelson,
Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 519
(2014).
13
My essential argument was that, although the sort of deference urged by Professor
Nelson might be reasonable in many contexts, in the area of racial preferences it was not,
because university behavior in this area was so dogmatic and misleading. When the
Supreme Court’s 2003 decisions in Grutter and Gratz imposed new limitations on racial
preferences, many universities—and most law schools—had actually increased their use of
racial preferences. When the U.S. Civil Rights Commission issued two reports raising
9
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finished, and the question and answer portion began, Professor Cho
distributed a copy of the ESB to the audience, with the standard
comment that the audience could better evaluate my comments if they
knew what other social scientists thought of my work. With my time up,
and on my remote monitor, I was not in a very good position to respond
to and engage the ESB claims. I encouraged anyone in the audience to
ask me to discuss any specific claim they could identify, but there were
no takers. It felt to me like a completely non-substantive, ad hominem,
and unfair attack.14
It therefore seems appropriate to take the opportunity afforded by
the written version of the symposium to provide the sort of thoughtful
engagement that I would have liked to provide the live symposium
audience. What follows is an assessment—though it may sound more
like an expose—of the “Empirical Scholars Brief.” The thrust of my
analysis is that the ESB is not just substantively wrong, but it is also a
deeply dishonest document that relies on outright falsehoods and
misleading claims to support an argument, which should be
embarrassing to its signatories, and is entitled to no substantive weight
in discussions of mismatch and affirmative action.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MISMATCH DEBATE
Sociologists have long been interested in so-called “peer effects” in
education—that is, the question of how one’s performance is helped or
hurt by the ability of one’s peers.15 In a famous essay from the mid1960s, James Davis elaborated the idea of the “Frog Pond” and suggested
that careers were often helped by being a comparatively “big frog” in
college, rather than being a “small frog” in a bigger pond—that is, a
middling student at a more elite college.16 Once affirmative action came
along, it was obvious to many insiders that the systematic use of large
preferences to increase minority enrollment at elite schools might create
a perverse “frog pond” effect. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman
noted this, almost in passing, as early as 1968 in a much more wideranging study of higher education called The Academic Revolution.17

strong concerns about the “mismatch” phenomenon, no institution of higher education had
even bothered to acknowledge the reports.
14
Some members of the audience emailed me later, expressing largely the same view.
15
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Twenty-First Century Social Science on School Racial Diversity
and Educational Outcomes, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1173, 1187 n.72 (2008).
16
James A. Davis, The Campus as a Frog Pond: An Application of the Theory of Relative
Deprivation to Career Decisions of College Men, 72 AM. J. SOC. 17, 20–21, 31 (1966).
17
See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAVID RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION
(1968) (discussing the future of African Americans in universities).
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Clyde Summers, in a 1970 essay, specifically pointed out the danger of
mismatch for minority law students,18 and Thomas Sowell discussed the
mismatch problem extensively.19 However, useful data for examining
student outcomes was notoriously hard to come by, and this along with
the ideological voltage of the mismatch issue deterred many researchers
from studying it.
That changed in the mid-1990s, as new challenges to racial
preferences arose,20 and social scientists became more interested in issues
surrounding student outcomes and the “value-added” of college
education. Two teams of scholars independently published significant,
peer-reviewed studies in 1996; though neither study used the term
“mismatch,” each found different types of harms flowing to minority
students who received large preferences.21 Then, in 1998, came the
monumental The Shape of the River, a book by two eminent former college
presidents, William Bowen (formerly of Princeton) and Derek Bok
(formerly of Harvard).22 Bowen headed the Mellon Foundation, and the

18
See generally Clyde W. Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real
Problem, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 377 (discussing negative implications of preferential
admissions).
19
Sowell has written memorably on this issue a number of times. See THOMAS SOWELL,
The Plight of Black College Students, in EDUCATION: ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORY 130 (1986),
for an example of such work.
20
The Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas declared university preferences
broadly unconstitutional, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision not to review the case
suggested to many that the Court tacitly agreed with this view. 78 F.3d 932, 934, 948 (5th
Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Later that year, California
voters passed Proposition 209, the first of a series of state measures (now adopted by five
states) that at least nominally prohibited the use of racial preferences in state programs
(including state university admissions). See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Seems to Favor
Affirmative Action Ban, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2013/
oct/15/nation/la-na-court-affirmative-action-20131016
(“Since
California's
voters
approved Proposition 209 in 1996, voters in five other states, including Michigan, have
adopted similar laws.”); see also Terence Chea, California Affirmative Action: Campus
Diversity Suffers under Race-Blind Policies, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 21, 2012, 3:28 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/21/california-affirmative-action_n_1442851.
html (discussing California’s decision to prohibit race-based preferences).
21
See generally Rogers Elliott et al., The Role of Ethnicity in Choosing and Leaving Science in
Highly Selective Institutions, 37 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 681 (1996) (discussing the causes of high
attrition rates for African American students in science); Linda Datcher Loury & David
Garman, College Selectivity and Earnings, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 289 (1995) (discussing the effects of
selectivity on graduation rates and earnings for African Americans).
22
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998);
Derek Bok: Terms of Office: 1971–1991 and 2006–2007, HARVARD U., http://www.harvard.
edu/history/presidents/bok (last visited Sept. 24, 2013); William G. Bowen: President
Emeritus, ANDREW W. MELLON FOUND., http://www.mellon.org/about_foundation/staff/
office-of-the-president/williambowen (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
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foundation spent millions assembling the first broad longitudinal
databases of student backgrounds, college outcomes, and subsequent
careers—called the “College and Beyond” data—across twenty-eight
colleges that ranged from elite (for example, the University of North
Carolina) to very elite (for example, Harvard).23 Bowen and Bok
examined dozens of different aspects of affirmative action and
concluded that, in general, the effects of preferences were highly
beneficial both to the students who received them and the schools that
used them.24 Notably, however, Bowen and Bok completely ignored the
recent studies that had found strong evidence of mismatch, and the
Mellon Foundation declined to make the College and Beyond data
available to anyone seeking to replicate Bowen and Bok’s results.25
Over the next seven years, a moderate but steady flow of research
appeared on the effects of college selectivity upon student outcomes.
The research was not all of consistent quality, but what I would consider
the three strongest studies all found strong evidence of mismatch effects
that hurt, on average, students receiving admissions preferences.26
Strikingly, however, these studies were ignored, not only by the media
but also by other academics. In stark contrast to The Shape of the River,
which received massive media coverage, these studies did not even
generate more than a handful of invitations to the authors to give
academic talks.
23
See William G. Bowen: President Emeritus, supra note 22 (discussing Bowen’s role in
creating “an in-house research program to investigate doctoral education, collegiate
admissions, independent research libraries, and charitable nonprofits”). The database,
which Mellon continued to build even after the book’s publication, was called the College
and Beyond database. See 1997: President’s Report, ANDREW W. MELLON FOUND.,
www.mellon.org/news_publications/annual-reports-essays/presidents-reports/content
1997 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (discussing the College and Beyond database).
24
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 22, at 256, 279–84.
25
See generally Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the
River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583 (1999) (criticizing Bowen and Bok’s study on several grounds).
26
See STEPHEN COLE & ELINOR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY: THE
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 211–12 (2003)
(concluding that African American students at elite schools receive lower grades than
students with similar levels of preparation, as opposed to African American students at
non-elite schools); Peter Arcidiacono, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: How Do
Admission and Financial Aid Rules Affect Future Earnings?, 73 ECONOMETRICA 1477, 1479
(2005) (concluding that under current affirmative action programs “the percentage of black
students falls dramatically at top-tier schools”); Frederick L. Smyth & John J. McArdle,
Ethnic and Gender Differences in Science Graduation at Selective Colleges with Implications for
Admission Policy and College Choice, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 353, 373 (2004) (concluding that
the research conducted on students in the College and Beyond database is consistent with
the finding that “race-sensitive admission, while increasing access to elite colleges, was
inadvertently causing disproportionate loss of talented underrepresented minority
students from science majors”).
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This was shocking, because these works had generated very careful
evidence that was completely inconsistent with The Shape of the River.
Stephen Cole and Elinor Barber, for example, had secured the backing of
the Council of Ivy League Presidents to launch a major empirical study
of the pipeline of minority students into academia.27 The study’s backers
and funders were, without exception, strong supporters of affirmative
action; Cole and Barber undertook an ambitious but careful study
involving over seven thousand students.28 Their unequivocal finding
was that large preferences tended to place promising minority students
in institutions where they struggled academically, leading to poor grades
and an abandonment of early plans to pursue an academic career.29 It
was a direct, closely reasoned refutation of a key argument in The Shape
of the River—written by academics who had every incentive to find the
opposite—and it was ignored by the very college presidents who
sponsored the project.
Similarly, Frederick Smyth and John McArdle, two psychologists at
the University of Virginia,30 managed to secure the very same database
Bowen and Bok had used in The Shape of the River to test more carefully
the question of science mismatch—that is, whether students are less
likely to secure a degree in so-called “STEM” fields31 if they received a
large admissions preference. Indeed it did: Smyth and McArdle found
that one of the most powerful determinants of a college student’s
persistence in STEM was the student’s level of academic mismatch with
his peers.32 Regardless of whether the recipient of an admissions
preference was white, black, or Hispanic, mismatched students had
greatly reduced chances of getting a STEM degree.33 Smyth and
McArdle’s research was published in a distinguished peer-reviewed
journal and even received an academic award—but once again, the
media and academic defenders of affirmative action completely ignored
a direct rebuttal of The Shape of the River.34
In November 2004, the Stanford Law Review published my study of
law school mismatch, in which I argued that large racial preferences
COLE & BARBER, supra note 26, at 39–40.
Id. at 39.
29
Id. at 211–12.
30
McArdle is now at the University of Southern California. About: John McArdle, UNIV.
S. CALIF., http://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1008336&CFID=
16867353&CFTOKEN=11061391 (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
31
STEM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math. SANDER & TAYLOR,
supra note 5, at 34.
32
Smyth & McArdle, supra note 26, at 373, 376.
33
Id. at 376.
34
Smyth and McArdle’s research was published in Research in Higher Education. See
generally id.
27
28
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could account for fully half of the enormous black/white gap in bar
passage rates.35 Compared to many studies of mismatch, this one was at
least arguably unsophisticated; it used very simple models and
mathematics. But it documented for the first time some very disturbing
phenomena that the official organs of legal education had effectively
suppressed, such as the dismal fact that the median black student at elite
law schools had grades at the 6th percentile of white students and that a
majority (now probably two-thirds) of blacks entering law school did not
graduate and pass the bar on their first attempt.36 It also laid out a
simple, five-step argument about law school mismatch that no critic has
ever seriously engaged: (1) large racial preferences tend to place black
students in schools where their entering credentials will be far below
those of most of their classmates; (2) blacks tend to get poor law school
grades, overwhelmingly because of large preferences (not because of
race per se, since blacks and whites with similar credentials get very
nearly the same grades in law school); (3) law school grades are closely
associated with bar performance (and thus, implicitly, with law school
learning)—when one controls for law school grades and school, blacks
do as well as whites on the bar exam, but (4) when one controls only for
pre-law credentials (LSAT, undergraduate grades), blacks do far worse
than comparable whites on the bar exam.37 The joint implication of these
four facts is (5) large preferences tend to put their recipients in
environments where they will learn less than otherwise, and thus,
systemically, operate to greatly disadvantage blacks relative to
comparable whites in the learning process and thus on bar exams.
I knew my article would be controversial within legal academia, and
I went out of my way to solicit input from likely critics. Some of these
readers cautioned me to soften my language—I did—but none raised
serious substantive objections to the central arguments and conclusions.
Soon, however—and many months before the article was even
published—word of the article spread, and it quickly became a dominant
topic of conversation within legal academic circles. In sharp contrast to
the total silence that had met other mismatch work, the article—called A
Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, or
“Systemic Analysis” for short—generated extraordinarily intense interest.
The journal that published the article—Stanford Law Review—experienced
unprecedented demand for the piece. When I posted a copy on my
35
See Sander, supra note 2, at 418–25 (discussing the impact of racial preferences on bar
passage rates).
36
Id. at 426, 454.
37
See Sander, supra note 3, at 1967–69 (summing up the arguments presented in Systemic
Analysis).
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website, it was downloaded tens of thousands of times. The New York
Times and several NPR programs discussed the article, and I was invited
to give dozens of talks.38
All of the attention given Systemic Analysis did have some effect.
Most observers seem to agree that the debate about affirmative action
has shifted from being predominantly a moral dispute about the
propriety of racial preferences, to one that also considers their practical
effects and effectiveness. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights held a
hearing on the article and issued a report urging a variety of reforms and
greater transparency.39 More social scientists became interested in “peer
effect” questions, and mismatch research flourished. A growing array of
public intellectuals agreed that academic mismatch is a serious problem.
Yet within the legal academy, little or no reform has come about.
This is partly because race—and affirmative action—are, of course,
extraordinarily sensitive issues. Even academic leaders skeptical about
the benefits of existing programs are likely to be hesitant to disturb the
status quo. But the inaction has been helped along by the adamancy
with which some distinguished academic leaders, including such figures
as Lee Bollinger and Derek Bok, have insisted that the mismatch issue is
a chimera—that it is merely a hypothesis that simply has no underlying
support.40 Such claims are generally made without any elaboration. But
the same sort of claim is made in the “Empirical Scholars Brief,” and at
least at first glance, it would appear that its eminent signatories are
supporting this claim in detail. I turn, then, to the genesis and content of
the ESB.

E.g., Slater, supra note 7; Study Disputes Benefits of Affirmative Action, NPR (Dec. 6,
2004), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4204293. Very notably,
however, nearly always I was invited to give talks by lawyer organizations or student
organizations (often black- or minority-sponsored), and usually the talk was framed as a
“debate” with an (often uninformed) critic. Few law school faculties invited me to speak.
Indeed, although students at three of the top five law schools invited me to give talks, no
top-20 law school faculty did the same. I was told this was because of the political
“sensitivity” of the subject.
39
See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS (2007), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/AALSreport.pdf (discussing the
Systemic Analysis article and producing several disclosure recommendations).
40
See, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, The Real Mismatch, SLATE (May 30, 2013, 10:21 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/05/supreme_cou
rt_and_affirmative_action_don_t_make_schools_trade_race_for_class.html (asserting that,
contrary to the mismatch theory, respected studies show “that both minority and lowincome students who went to top-tier colleges do better later in life than equally smart
students who did not”).
38
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III. THE “EMPIRICAL SCHOLARS BRIEF”
A. Origins: Fisher Goes to the Supreme Court
In October 2011, Stuart Taylor and I submitted a brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court, urging it to grant certiorari in Fisher.41 At the time, the
Court’s dominant guidance on how universities could use “race” as a
factor in admissions decisions was its 2003 decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger.42 Our general argument was that Grutter had not worked out
as most of the Justices had probably intended and that it needed to be
either clarified or revised. Grutter had stipulated various tests to be used
in determining whether a college’s use of preferences could survive a
court’s strict scrutiny, such as whether admissions officers used
“individualized consideration” or formulas using race in a standardized
way, and whether a college had made significant efforts to use raceneutral criteria to achieve diversity and was trying to phase out its
reliance on race.43 Our brief argued that, if one looked at the available
data, the general picture was that colleges were either ignoring these
standards or interpreting them so broadly as to render them
meaningless.44 We documented, for example, that the available data
suggested that racial preferences at law schools, at least, had become
even larger and more mechanical since Grutter, and that many
institutions gave little or no weight to diversity factors other than race.45
Taylor and I also discussed mismatch, arguing that a rising volume
of evidence was finding that large admissions preferences, of whatever
kind, tended to hurt, rather than help, the educational outcomes of their
recipients.46 In the context of Fisher, our point was not whether
“mismatch” had been proven beyond doubt but that the actual benefits
of affirmative action were so murky and contestable that courts should
not be particularly deferential to a university’s determination that it had

Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Petitioner, supra note 6.
See 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (concluding that race is a permissible factor in admission
decisions).
43
Id. at 334, 339–40.
44
See Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Petitioner, supra note 6, at 13–18 (explaining
the standards set forth in Grutter and providing examples of the ways in which university
racial preferences have failed to abide by those standards).
45
Id. at 15–16. These and related claims were developed in more detail in an article that
I contributed to a collection of essays by political scientists. See generally Richard Sander,
Why Strict Scrutiny Requires Transparency: The Practical Effects of Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL POLITICS 277 (Kevin T. McGuire ed., 2012) (discussing the
unforeseen effects of Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter on university admissions).
46
See Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Petitioner, supra note 6, at 4–8 (discussing a
variety of studies that have found evidence supporting the mismatch theory).
41
42
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a compelling justification to use racial preferences. Our brief attracted a
fair amount of attention and discussion,47 and though we cannot of
course know what factors entered into the Court’s deliberations, the
Supreme Court did grant certiorari to Fisher in February 2012.48 The case
would be set for argument in Fall 2012, and probably decided in Spring
2013.
Stuart Taylor and I wrote another brief, this time on the merits of
Fisher, which we filed at the end of May 2012.49 As with our initial brief,
our goal was to put before the Court relevant empirical findings and
data we thought would be helpful to their deliberations. Though we
were certainly making an argument and urged the Court to tighten or
revise Grutter, we did not argue that racial preferences should never be
used. We tried to point out where the evidence supporting our
arguments was stronger or weaker, and we cited research inconsistent
with our position.50 We even went so far as to file our brief “in support
of neither party”—an unusual step that signals to the Court that a party’s
main goal is to present information and ideas, not simply to advance the
chances of one side or the other winning.51
The respondent, the University of Texas (“UT”), filed its response
brief in August 2012,52 and briefs in support of the respondent were due
a week later. It was an impressive collection.53 In addition to an amicus
brief from the United States Solicitor General, UT was supported by
briefs from “seventeen U[.]S[.] senators; sixty-six U[.]S[.] congressmen;
fifty-seven of the Fortune 100 American corporations; thirty-seven
retired military and defense leaders; fifteen states; [and] well over one
hundred colleges and universities.”54 Most of these briefs generally
E.g., George F. Will, Op-Ed., The Unintended Consequences of Racial Preferences, WASH.
POST (Nov. 30, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-30/opinions/35282841
_1_racial-preferences-minorities-academic-freedom.
48
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
1536 (2012).
49
Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6.
50
Id. at 9–10.
51
Id. at 1.
52
Brief for Respondents, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
53
See Mark Walsh, It Was Another Big Term for Amicus Curiae Briefs at the High Court,
J.
(Sept.
1,
2013,
3:30
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/
A.B.A.
magazine/article/it_was_another_big_term_for_amicus_curiae_briefs_at_the_high_court/
(noting that the ninety-two amicus briefs filed in Fisher came close to the record of ninetysix briefs).
54
SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 187. For the online version of these briefs, see
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, SCOTUSBLOG, www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/fisher-v-university-of-texas-at-austin (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). Virtually no
establishment organizations filed briefs in support of Fisher. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note
5, at 187.
47
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discussed the importance of preserving racial preferences in education.
A few briefs, by academics or educational institutions, took on the
“mismatch” issue in general and the Sander-Taylor brief in particular.55
However the ESB quickly became the best known of these attacks and
the one relied on almost uniformly by critics in upcoming discussions of
the case.
There were eleven signatories to the ESB, and these fell into two
groups. Four of the signatories—Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks, Daniel Ho,
and Richard Lempert—were law professors with social science training
who had written early empirical critiques of Systemic Analysis.56 A fifth,
Paul Oyer, was a Stanford Business School professor who had written on
a related mismatch issue—the effect of law school eliteness on career
earnings—and whose findings had sharply conflicted with my own.57
The other signatories were for the most part friends and colleagues of
these five. They included Guido Imbens, an economist at Stanford
Business School; Donald Rubin, a Professor of Statistics at Harvard; Gary
King, a political scientist at Harvard; Richard Berk, a distinguished
statistician at the University of Pennsylvania; Kevin Quinn, a political
scientist at UC Berkeley’s School of Law; and James Greiner, a statistician
and law professor at Harvard.58 It was an eminent group, and the brief
emphasized the prestige they brought to the enterprise by giving a short
biography of each author. For example, the brief noted:
Gary King is the Albert J. Weatherhead III University
Professor at Harvard University—one of only 24 with
the title of University Professor, Harvard’s most
55
E.g., Brief of American Social Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 34–35, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief of The American
Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 24–
32, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief for The National Black Law Students
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5–6, 8–12, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345). See generally Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9 (arguing against
the Sander and Taylor brief and the “mismatch” theory).
56
See Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 1–7 (listing and providing background
information for the eleven ESB signatories). For these signatories’ critiques of Systemic
Analysis, see generally Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the
Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2005); David L. Chambers et al., The Real
Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of
Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005); Daniel E. Ho, Why Affirmative Action
Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005).
57
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 6 (providing Paul Oyer’s background). For
Oyer’s piece on the correlation between law school eliteness and earnings, see generally
Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, The Returns to Attending a Prestigious Law School (Working
Paper, 2009), available at www.econ.wisc.edu/workshop/selective.pdf.
58
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 1–5 (listing and providing background
information for the ESB signatories).
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distinguished faculty position. He is based in the
Department of Government and serves as Director of the
Institute for Quantitative Social Science. He has been
elected Fellow in six honorary societies (National
Academy of Sciences 2010, American Statistical
Association 2009, American Association for the
Advancement of Science 2004, American Academy of
Arts and Sciences 1998, Society for Political
Methodology 2008, and American Academy of Political
and Social Science 2004) and has won more than 30 “best
of” awards for his work, including leading contributions
to the statistics of causal inference. He was listed as the
most cited political scientist of his cohort. His research
has been supported by the National Science Foundation,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the
World Health Organization, the National Institute of
Aging, the Global Forum for Health Research, as well as
numerous centers, corporations, foundations, and other
federal agencies.59
These names alone gave the ESB an air of credibility and serious
purpose.
B. The Empirical Scholars’ Central Argument
The general thrust of the ESB is that the Sander-Taylor brief was
mere rhetorical puffery and that the social science support we claimed
for our views is utterly without merit or substance.60 It makes this case
in a variety of ways, but very clearly the core of the brief lies in its
Section 3C, which purports to identify three fundamental
methodological flaws in the research by scholars who have found
evidence of law school mismatch.61 Professor Doug Williams, the Chair
of Economics at Sewanee University, and I were the principal scholars in
question throughout the ESB.62

59
60
61
62

Id. at 3.
See id. at 8–9 (“The Sander ‘mismatch’ research . . . is not good social science.”).
Id. at 19–25.
Id. at 16–25 (critiquing Williams’s and Sander’s findings on mismatch).
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First Critique

The first ESB critique is that “the primary comparison that Sander
and Williams employ is that of black and white students.”63 The
common-sense idea behind this criticism is that if one found, for
example, that blacks did worse than whites on bar exams and attributed
this to the fact that blacks get admitted with racial preferences and
whites do not, then one’s reasoning might be fallacious—the weaker
black performance might result not from preferences, but from
something else altogether that was associated with race but not
associated with preferences (for example, bar exams that tested white
cultural knowledge in some subtle way). This criticism had been
advanced some years ago about Systemic Analysis, which, as noted above,
did indeed use an extended black-white comparison as part of its basic
argument about the mismatch effect.64 One simple rebuttal to this
criticism is that the tests I present in Systemic Analysis are specifically
intended to rule out racial causes of the black-white performance gap.
However, the surpassing problem with this first critique is that it is
simply untrue. In Professor Doug Williams’s detailed and masterful
article, Do Racial Preferences Affect Minority Learning in Law Schools?,
published this past June in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
(“Williams JELS Article”), he presented the results of literally dozens of
different analyses of mismatch effects.65 In every case, Williams’s analyses
compared students within the same racial group or groups!66 This is no matter
of interpretation or argument: the authors of the ESB simply lie.
Their black/white critique is facially untrue even when limited to
my work. In my follow up to Systemic Analysis, an essay called A Reply to
Critics—also published by Stanford Law Review—I had responded
specifically to the criticism of using white-black comparisons by showing
that much the same results occurred when one compared black law
students with other black law students, using the “first-choice/secondchoice” methodology discussed in greater detail below.67 In yet another
peer-reviewed piece that Williams and I wrote—along with economist
Marc Luppino—about the work of Katherine Barnes, we again used
Id. at 20.
See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (discussing the methodology and
findings set forth in Systemic Analysis).
65
See generally Doug Williams, Do Racial Preferences Affect Minority Learning in Law
Schools?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2013) (analyzing mismatch effects).
66
See id. at 172 (noting that the article is restricted to “within-race analyses”).
67
See Sander, supra note 3, at 1973–78 (providing statistical data indicating that African
Americans who attended their second-choice school performed significantly better than
African Americans who attended their first-choice school).
63
64
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intra-racial comparisons to demonstrate mismatch effects.68 And in a
third work that I wrote with Jane Bambauer, which was published in the
peer-reviewed Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, we analyzed the career
effects of law school mismatch using data only on white students.69
2.

Second Critique

The second ESB critique is that “Sander and Williams . . . adjust not
only for pre-existing characteristics, but also for outcomes” in the
regressions finding mismatch effects.70 The apparent idea behind this
critique is that if law school preferences cause mismatch by elevating
some students to schools that are not optimal for them, then one should
measure this effect by controlling only for the pre-law academic
characteristics of students, such as LSAT scores and college grades. A
sound argument lies at the heart of this critique: if one is studying
whether the students who receive large preferences have more trouble
passing the bar, then controlling for whether a student graduates from
law school could distort the analysis.71 It is true that, in some passages of
Systemic Analysis, I drew inferences from one or two regressions that
could reasonably be criticized on theoretical grounds—although the
inferences could be shown to be empirically true on other grounds. But
the thrust of the ESB critique is that Williams and I have not produced
valid findings of mismatch in law schools because we have ignored this
principle, and that is clearly false.
The central argument of Systemic Analysis—that mismatch accounts
for a large portion of the black-white gap in passing the bar—is

68
See generally Doug Williams et al., Revisiting Law School Mismatch: A Comment on
Barnes (2007, 2011), 105 NW. U. L. REV. 813 (2011) (providing intra-racial comparisons to
demonstrate mismatch effects in students with varying credential levels attending different
tiered law schools).
69
See generally Richard Sander & Jane Bambauer, The Secret of My Success: How Status,
Eliteness, and School Performance Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 893 (2012)
(studying the relative effect of attending more—or less—elite schools and often limiting the
analysis to white students).
70
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 22.
71
Suppose that a low-ranked law school A fails twenty percent of its first-year students
to keep its bar passage rate up, while high-ranked law school B graduates even its weakest
students. Suppose that School B admits some weak students through racial preferences
who graduate but go on to fail the bar. A comparably weak student attending School A
might well flunk out, and those students who graduated from School A would have
achieved some threshold of performance that would be positively related to their chances
of passing the bar. Consequently, an analysis of law school graduates with poor
credentials who attended either School A (with no affirmative action) or School B (with
affirmative action) might show an advantage to School A students that was due to School
A’s flunk-out policy rather than its non-use of affirmative action.
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established in regressions or tables that control only for the pre-law
characteristics of students.72 Likewise, the Williams JELS Article used an
outcome variable, called “Smooth Passage,” that was specifically
designed to measure mismatch outcomes using only pre-law
credentials.73 In this analysis, all students in the dataset who entered law
school received a “1” if they graduated and passed the bar on their first
attempt; otherwise they received a “0.”74 The analysis, in other words,
examines the central mismatch outcome—do students cleanly graduate
and pass the bar on their first attempt—controlling only for the “preexisting credentials” that the ESB calls for. Indeed, although Williams
was writing well before the ESB appeared, he specifically discussed in his
article the utility of “Smooth Passage” in avoiding the type of bias ESB claims
affects his analysis! Strikingly, many of the strongest mismatch findings
demonstrated in the Williams JELS Article come from this “Smooth
Passage” variable.
Indeed, Williams and I analyzed many models that avoided the
“intermediate outcomes” issue propounded by the ESB. In my Reply to
Critics—which I specifically addressed to several of the ESB authors—I
conducted an analysis that examined the proportion of the “[e]ntering
[c]ohort” of black students who became lawyers, adjusting only for prelaw credentials (i.e., making the adjustment the ESB argued for).75 The
analysis shows a significant mismatch effect experienced by blacks.
Similarly, an article in which Williams and I collaborated with two other
social scientists—economist Marc Luppino and psychometrician Roger
Bolus—re-analyzed the data from a mismatch critic, Katherine Barnes;
included analyses that controlled only for pre-law credentials; and again
found clear evidence of mismatch effects.76 This ESB critique, then, was
also utter nonsense. Williams and I repeatedly found powerful evidence
of mismatch effects with precisely the type of model the ESB claimed we
lacked.
It is worth noting in passing that there is nothing wrong with
controlling for intermediate outcomes, if one has a good reason to do it.
In some of Williams’s analyses, for example, he limits the pool of people
he examines to students who have actually graduated from law school
and taken a bar exam.77 He does this because the specific outcome of
See Sander, supra note 2, at 428 tbl.5.2, 441 tbl.5.7, 446 tbl.6.2 (utilizing SAT scores,
undergraduate GPAs, and academic index level to predict first-year law school grades,
measure matriculation rates, and measure bar passage rates).
73
Williams, supra note 65, at 180–83.
74
Id. at 180.
75
Sander, supra note 3, at 1975 tbl.3.
76
Williams et al., supra note 68, at 819, 827–28 tbl.3.
77
E.g., Williams, supra note 65, at 179.
72
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whether mismatched students are more likely to pass or fail the bar when
they attempt the exam is of intrinsic interest. In Table 6.1 of Systemic
Analysis, I report a regression on people who take the bar exam,
controlling for the law school grades of bar-takers, as a way of
demonstrating that blacks with comparable law school performance
levels are as likely as whites to pass the bar.78 These analyses are flawed
only if they stand alone—that is, if one does not recognize the need to
run analyses with no intermediate variables for purposes of comparison.
Social scientists speak of a result being “robust” when it holds up even
when one changes the details of the model used to test it. Testing the
robustness of one’s results is always a virtue in social science analysis;
one of the great virtues of the Williams JELS Article is that the mismatch
findings are highly robust to an unusually broad range of models and
tests.
3.

Third Critique

The third ESB critique contended that, to generate valid inferences
about mismatch, one must compare students with similar credentials
attending schools in different tiers of eliteness.79
The credibility of a causal inference depends on the
credibility of the assumptions. One natural way forward
with the bar-passage data is to compare students with
identical observed pre-existing characteristics (i.e.,
undergraduate GPA scores, LSAT scores, race, and
gender)
who
attend
different
law-school
tiers. . . . Research that applies these principles has not
found any substantially and statistically significant
effects on bar passage.80
Once again, the ESB articulates a reasonable methodological goal. The
suggestion that one make “apples to apples” comparison is indeed a
good aspirational statement for mismatch research.
Once again,
however, ESB is simply wrong in implying that Williams and I failed to
make appropriate comparisons. Ironically, it cites an example of
research—the work of Dan Ho, one of the signatories—that notably fails
to make proper comparisons.81

78
79
80
81

Sander, supra note 2, at 444 tbl.6.1.
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 22.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
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This “apples to apples” critique really has two different parts: first,
that one must compare students across different tiers of law school—that
is, students facing different levels of mismatch; and second, that one
must use effective scholastic controls to make sure one is comparing
students of similar academic ability. On both counts, the Williams JELS
Article stands out as exceptionally careful and effective. Consider the
“different tiers” issue first. All of the scholarly literature on law school
mismatch relies heavily on the one large dataset, created in the 1990s by
the Law School Admissions Council, that tracks students over a long
period of time; the dataset is known as the “Bar Passage Study,” or
“BPS” for short.82 The BPS did not reveal law school identities, but it
grouped schools into six “tiers” that roughly correlated with school
eliteness.83 Because the eliteness of law schools in each tier overlaps with
those of adjacent tiers, one cannot be sure that students in adjacent tiers
are actually in schools of differing eliteness. To deal with these
ambiguities, Williams compared, in one section of his paper, students at
the top two tiers with students in the bottom two tiers.84 He found large
mismatch effects—that is, black or minority students in the bottom two
tiers had better outcomes than otherwise similar students in the top two
tiers.85
This brings us to the second issue—what do we mean by “similar”
students? There are many different dimensions of academic ability
through which we would like to compare students, and available
datasets generally have only a limited number of control variables.
Williams used what was available, but his work, in conjunction with
mine, goes further. In my Reply to Critics, I demonstrated that when one
uses a limited number of control variables, this tends to bias the analysis
against finding mismatch.86 The reason is fairly obvious; there is
something commonly referred to by social scientists as a “selection
effect” operating in law school admissions. Suppose we have a sample
of law students, all of the same race, who are attending schools of
varying levels of eliteness and for whom we only know one academic
credential (for example, LSAT scores). Suppose we match pairs of
students who have the same LSAT score but who attended schools of
differing levels of eliteness. It is not certain, but quite probable, that in
any given pair the student at the more elite school has a higher college

LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL
BAR PASSAGE STUDY (1998), available at http://www.unc.edu/edp/pdf/NLBPS.pdf.
83
Id. at 8–9.
84
Williams, supra note 65, at 187–88 & tbl.4.
85
Id. at 188 & tbl.4, 189.
86
See Sander, supra note 3, at 1990–92 (discussing selection bias issues).
82
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GPA than the student at the less elite school. Why? Simply because
more elite schools are more academically selective in admissions, and so
on any random academic characteristic their students are likely to have a
higher level of achievement—that is why they are at the more selective
school.
In my Reply to Critics, I empirically demonstrated this “selection
effect” in the BPS data. It is easy to do. No one has empirically
demonstrated otherwise, and scholars in the field with whom I have
discussed the issue routinely concede that such a selection effect exists
and that it tends to bias “mismatch” analyses against finding evidence of
mismatch. In other words, when we simply compare students at schools
of differing eliteness and control for their “observed” academic
characteristics, the students at the more elite schools usually have
stronger “unobserved” characteristics, and the comparison, a fortiori, is
thus somewhat biased against finding that the student at the less elite
school will have, for example, better performance on the bar exam.
Consequently, when Williams finds that black students at less elite
schools outperform on the bar black students with similar “observed”
characteristics at more elite schools, this is an especially powerful
finding.
One approach to dealing with this selection effect compares pairs of
students who are admitted to the same elite school, where one member
of the pair actually attends that school and the other member attends a
less elite school. In this way, one is probably minimizing differences in
“unobservables” since both students in the pair were academically
strong enough to be admitted to the more elite school. Alan Krueger and
Stacy Dale used this approach in a pair of well-known studies of the
effects of elite schooling on earnings;87 it is also used in a recent study of
science mismatch conducted by Marc Luppino and me.88 The BPS data
does not allow us to do something quite this clean, but as economists Ian
87
See generally Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a
More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q. J.
ECON. 1491 (2002) (finding that students of similar ability earn the same regardless of the
selectiveness of the school they graduate from, while lower income students earn more
after graduating from a more selective school); Stacy Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the
Return to College Selectivity over the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17159, 2011), available at http://www.mathematicampr.net/publications/PDFs/education/returntocollege.pdf (demonstrating the effects of
elite schooling on earnings by extending the authors’ earlier work).
88
See generally Marc Luppino & Richard Sander, College Major Competitiveness and
Attrition
from
the
Sciences
(Working
Paper,
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167961
(accounting
for
unobservables and finding evidence of mismatch among students pursuing science
degrees).
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Ayres and Richard Brooks pointed out in 2005, it does permit an
analogous sort of exercise.89 The BPS data includes information from
each law student on the number of law schools to which they applied;
how many schools offered them admission; whether, if they were offered
admission, they decided to attend their “first or only choice,” “second
choice,” or “third or lower choice” law school; and if they did not attend
It is easy to empirically
their “first-choice” school, why not.90
demonstrate that students who attend their second- or third-choice
schools tend to be at less elite schools than otherwise similar students
who attend their first-choice schools. When applied to black or minority
students, then, this provides a quasi-natural experiment in what happens
to students who receive larger or smaller admissions preferences and
thus have varying degrees of potential mismatch.
Ayres and Brooks attempted such an analysis in 2005 and found
“mixed” evidence in support of the mismatch hypothesis.91 For reasons I
have recounted elsewhere, these results were not particularly
trustworthy, and they were not peer-reviewed.92 Williams replicated
their analysis and found quite strong support for mismatch, under a
wide variety of specifications; these results are reported in a working
paper and in his peer-reviewed article in the Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies.93 In conjunction with the many other demonstrations of law
school mismatch, the cumulative force of the evidence on this point is
overwhelming. Law school mismatch does exist and explains most, or
all, of the “unexplained” gap in black and white bar passage rates.
I have offered this detailed discussion of Williams’s analysis partly
to explain why it is strong on its own terms but also partly to illustrate
the “Alice-in-Wonderland” quality of the ESB. The ESB’s first two
critiques of Williams’s work, as we have seen, are simply false.94 The
89
See generally Ayres & Brooks, supra note 56 (relying on the BPS to respond to Sander’s
mismatch theory).
90
See LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, USER’S GUIDE: LSAC
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL DATA FILE app. B at 14 (1999), available at
http://www2.law.ucla.edu/sander/Systemic/data/LSAC/bps_usersguide_layout.pdf
(providing the questionnaire that participants of the BPS study completed).
91
Ayres & Brooks, supra note 56, at 1831–38.
92
Sander, supra note 3, at 1986–96 (emphasizing the major flaws in the study Ayres and
Brooks conducted).
93
See Williams, supra note 65, at 172, 189–93 (finding evidence of mismatch after
conducting a study that separated students who attended their first-choice school from
those who attended a lower-choice school). Williams’s analysis included both a multiple
regression analysis of “first-choice/second-choice” students, as well as an analysis that
used “first-choice/second-choice” as an “instrument” for observing mismatch. Id. at 189,
191.
94
See supra Parts III.B.1–2 (discussing ESB’s first two critiques and highlighting the flaws
therein).
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third critique only makes sense if one concludes that, for some reason,
the “first-choice/second-choice” approach is an invalid way of studying
mismatch. But this method, as noted above, was developed by Ian Ayres and
Richard Brooks—both signatories of the ESB.95 What’s up with that? Have
these folks ever heard of estoppel?
A final twist that adds to the oddness of the third ESB critique is its
citation of another ESB author, Daniel Ho, as an exemplar of proper
mismatch research.96 Ho’s piece on mismatch was done while he was
still in graduate school, and it made elementary errors in analysis. Ho
compared students in the BPS who attended adjacent law school tiers;
that is, he compared Tier 1 students with Tier 2 students, and Tier 2
students with Tier 3 students.97 None of his published results compare
students who are more than one tier apart. But, as noted earlier, the BPS
tiers were inexact, so adjacent tiers included many schools that were, in
fact, identical in their level of eliteness. Since Ho “matched” students in
adjacent tiers who had identical credentials—such as race, gender, etc.—
his comparisons were almost certainly of students who also attended
schools of identical eliteness. This fails the first basic test of an
appropriate mismatch comparison—to compare students attending
schools with markedly different levels of eliteness.
4.

Reprise

The central argument of ESB is that concern about academic
mismatch in higher education has no basis because the research on law
school mismatch conducted by Doug Williams and myself commits three
fundamental errors of causal analysis.98 On the first two counts, ESB is
simply factually wrong. The third count is, to put it kindly, ridiculous.
Williams’s analysis of law school mismatch—which, unlike any of the
mismatch critiques, was actually subjected to peer review and published
in a top empirical journal—is highly attentive to the exact concerns
raised by the critics. Furthermore, its central methodology is built on
causal arguments—on the desirability of the first-choice/second-choice
approach—first developed by two of the ESB authors. How could these
95
See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing Williams’s reliance on
Ayres’s and Brooks’s analysis).
96
Compare Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 22 (citing to Daniel E. Ho et al.,
Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal
Inference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 199, 202 (2007) for support), with id. at 25 (citing to Daniel E. Ho,
Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997, 2002–
04 (2005) for support).
97
Ho, supra note 56, at 2003 fig.1.
98
See supra Part III.B (discussing the ESB’s arguments against mismatch and explaining
why such arguments are flawed).
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scholars, with their towering reputations, create such a dishonest set of
arguments? We will return to that question below.
C. Characterizing the Debate: The Other Empirical Scholars Argument
Since the ESB’s central critiques of the law school mismatch
scholarship are demonstrably false, the brief’s overall argument simply
collapses. The remainder of the brief focuses on two other “arguments,”
to use the word somewhat loosely.99 One is that the debate about higher
education mismatch can be fairly treated as, in reality, a debate about
law school mismatch. And the other is that many, many critiques of law
school mismatch have been published. The reader can see how these
arguments intrinsically fold back on themselves: if law school mismatch
has been effectively critiqued, how is it that the only three specific
critiques made by ESB are all false? But there is an important larger
falsehood here, which I shall try to elucidate in the next few pages.
1.

The Sander-Taylor Brief on Mismatch

To understand the ESB argument, we need to first briefly discuss the
brief I coauthored with Stuart Taylor and its argument about mismatch.
The argument section of our brief ran about thirty-six pages; about onethird of that dealt with the mismatch question and sought to give the
Court a sense of the breadth of mismatch research.100 We discussed four
general types of evidence about mismatch: “academic mismatch,”
“science mismatch,” the experience of the University of California
(“UC”) after racial preferences were made illegal by Proposition 209
(“Prop 209”), and “law school mismatch.”101 The Cole and Barber work
is the best work on the “academic mismatch” problem, documenting
how large racial preferences tend to lead to poor grades and thus erode
the interest of promising minority students in academic careers.102 The
Smyth-McArdle work is a fine example of research on “science
mismatch,” and its basic findings have been replicated in a series of
other studies.103 All of the studies on science mismatch have come to
strikingly similar conclusions: students who receive large preferences
into academic programs—regardless of race—such that their academic
credentials are significantly lower than those of their median classmates,

99
100
101
102
103

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss2/8

See Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 10–16.
Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6, at 2–14.
Id. at 5–6, 8, 11–13.
See supra text accompanying notes 27–29 (discussing Cole’s and Barber’s study).
See supra notes 30–34 (explaining the Smyth-McArdle study).
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are far less likely to graduate with a science degree than otherwise
comparable students who attend a less elite school.104
In both of these cases, as Taylor and I discuss in Mismatch,105 the
findings of these scholars have been completely ignored by defenders of
affirmative action, to an almost eerie degree. Even though each of these
studies was only possible because the researchers won the cooperation of
important proponents of affirmative action—the organization of Ivy
League Presidents in one case, the Mellon Foundation in another—these
and other institutions essentially ignored the results. I know of no peerreviewed or even published study that disputes either the “academic
mismatch” or “science mismatch” findings.
The same is nearly as true of research on the UC experience in the
wake of Prop 209. It is undisputed that, after the ban on racial
preferences, black and Hispanic enrollment fell significantly at the two
most elite UC campuses—Berkeley and UCLA—but rose at some of the
less elite campuses in the eight (now nine) campus system.106 It is
undisputed that, within a few years of the implementation of raceneutral policies, black and Hispanic enrollment in the total UC system
surpassed pre-Prop 209 levels and, within a few more years, had
surpassed pre-Prop 209 minority enrollment levels when we take into
account the demographic growth of the Hispanic population.107 It is
undisputed that black and Hispanic graduation rates rose sharply in the
years after Prop 209 and that the number of black and Hispanic graduate
students graduating with bachelor degrees had far surpassed, by the
middle of the last decade, levels achieved when race-based affirmative
action was widely used.108 Several scholars have done extensive research
on how the end—or at least, substantial reduction—of racial preferences
affected blacks and Hispanics in the UC system. A study done by labor
economist Kate Antonovics and myself, and published in the peerreviewed American Law and Economics Review, found that minority
enrollment levels at the UC did not suffer from Prop 209 as much as
expected because black and Hispanic students accepted offers of
COLE & BARBER, supra note 26, at 204–06; Smyth & McArdle, supra note 26, at 373, 376.
SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 39–40.
106
Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6, at 11 (citing
University of California Application, Admissions and Enrollment of California Resident Freshmen
for Fall 1989 Through 2010, UNIV. CAL. OFFICE PRESIDENT (Mar. 2011),
http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/flowfrc_10.pdf).
107
University of California Application, Admissions and Enrollment of California Resident
Freshmen for Fall 1989 Through 2010, UNIV. CAL. OFFICE PRESIDENT (Mar. 2011),
http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/flowfrc_10.pdf.
108
UNIV. OF CAL., DIVERSITY: ANNUAL ACCOUNTABILITY SUB-REPORT 24 & chart 23 (2010),
available at http://accountability.universityofcalifornia.edu/documents/diversity_sub
report_2010.pdf.
104
105
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admission at a substantially higher rate after racial preferences ended.109
Research by economists Peter Arcidiacono, Joe Hotz, Ken Spenner, and
Esteban Aucejo found that reduced mismatch after Prop 209 raised
graduation rates some and sharply improved the chances that blacks and
Hispanics pursuing science and engineering degrees would actually
succeed.110
Yet again, the positive developments at UC—by far the largest
system of elite public universities in the nation—have been ignored to an
astonishing degree, both by critics and even by UC officials. The
Chancellors and President of the University—a group that strongly
opposed Prop 209 and has frequently complained about its inability to
use racial preferences—even submitted a brief in the Fisher case that
highlighted the drops in minority enrollment at Berkeley and UCLA but
completely ignored the extraordinarily positive developments outlined
above.111 A few administrators have written articles contending that
Prop 209 has had harmful effects on minorities at the UC system, but
these pieces are ludicrously weak.112 It is fair to say that there has been
no meaningful scholarly engagement with the UC scholarship finding
mismatch effects.
One of the ironic things about the non-engagement of critical
scholars with the science mismatch, academic mismatch, and the UC
research is that this work is often done with significantly better data than
that available on the law school mismatch issue. The Smyth & McArdle
piece, for example, was able to precisely measure each individual
student’s level of “mismatch” (i.e., his or her credential gap with
109
Kate L. Antonovics & Richard H. Sander, Affirmative Action Bans and the “Chilling
Effect,” 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 252, 279 (2013).
110
See generally Peter Arcidiacono et al., University Differences in the Graduation of
Minorities in STEM Fields: Evidence from California (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18799, 2013) [hereinafter Arcidiacono et al., Evidence from California],
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18799.pdf?new_window=1 (finding that
students with relatively weaker entering credentials are more likely to leave the sciences
and take longer to graduate).
111
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the President and Chancellors of the University of
California in Support of Respondents at 18–19, 29–33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133
S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (providing information regarding the decline in minority
enrollment at the most selective institutions in the UC system).
112
See, e.g., Susan A. Wilbur, Investigating the College Destinations of University of California
Freshman Admits, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 209, at 63, 64–66, 77 (2010) (asserting that the implementation of
Proposition 209 has resulted in a loss of top-ranking minority students); Chambers et al.,
supra note 56, at 1875–77 (asserting that gaps between incoming student credentials
continue post-Prop 209); William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and
Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 55–56, 117–18 (2013) (criticizing Proposition
209).
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classmates) at each institution in the database—something that is simply
not possible with the Bar Passage Study data.113 Other science mismatch
studies have been able to specifically compare pairs of students who
were admitted to the exact same undergraduate institution, where one
member of the pair chose to attend a less elite institution.114
As I observe, the Sander-Taylor brief devoted the bulk—more than
eighty percent—of its mismatch discussion to the academic mismatch,
science mismatch, and the UC experience literature. In turning to law
school mismatch, we noted the striking difference in that debate:
Unlike the “science mismatch” and “academic
mismatch” research discussed above, Sander’s “law
school mismatch” research generated extensive public
discussion, and many critiques have been published.
Although Sander’s data and calculations have been
confirmed by replication, several of the critics have
advanced alternate empirical models to test whether the
mismatch effect is large enough to actually reduce the
number of black lawyers produced each year. As
economist Doug Williams has pointed out, almost none
of these social science critiques have disputed the central
contention of the law school mismatch hypothesis: that
large preferences undermine learning in law school.115
Taylor and I then briefly discussed other critiques of mismatch, and
noted:
The social science literature arguing that racial
preferences do not hurt the intended beneficiaries has
overwhelmingly focused on graduation rates from
college. Some studies find that graduation rates are
undermined by large preferences, and some find that
they are not. But the controversy may be more apparent
than real. Graduation rates are under the control of
college administrators, who can adjust policies or inflate
grades to minimize academic “failures.”
This is
common at elite private colleges. But a student can
graduate and still be harmed by science mismatch,
Smyth & McArdle, supra note 26, at 364.
See supra text accompanying notes 87–88 (discussing scholars who have utilized this
approach, including myself).
115
Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6, at 8–9 (footnotes
omitted).
113
114
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academic mismatch, lower grades, lower aspirations,
less academic self-confidence and less promising career
prospects.116
2.

The ESB Response

The ESB authors, rather than engaging in honest debate on disputed
points, play a sort of ad hominem shell game, which has two parts. First,
they falsely claim that virtually the entire discussion of mismatch in the
Sander-Taylor brief was about law school mismatch: “Much of the cited
research has been in the law school context. . . . Sander’s and economics
professor Doug Williams’s law-school mismatch research . . . dominate
the empirical findings of the Sander-Taylor Brief . . . .”117 Therefore, the
ESB “focus[es] the rest of [its] arguments [on law school mismatch].”118
The claim that “law school mismatch” dominates the Sander-Taylor
brief is, for the reasons just discussed, an outright lie; our discussion
takes up two pages in the entire brief.119 It seems, rather, that the ESB
scholars—like all other critics to date of mismatch—do not want to, or do
not know how, to take on the “academic mismatch” or “science
mismatch” studies and therefore claim that if they discuss the “law
school mismatch” research, they have addressed all mismatch research.
But the chutzpah of the ESB authors goes further. They also contend
that the Sander-Taylor brief mischaracterizes the body of mismatch
research—that we suggest that there have been no critiques of mismatch
and that therefore there is a consensus among scholars that mismatch
exists.120 That, of course, is not true. At no point in the brief do we
suggest that the mismatch hypothesis has become an accepted,
uncontroversial truth. As noted above, we highlighted that law school
mismatch has been controversial and that many critiques have been
published.121 We also noted the conflicting evidence on whether
mismatch lowers minority graduation rates.122 We do note, and indeed
emphasize, that no one has challenged the “academic mismatch” and
“science mismatch” findings.
Consider these specific excerpts from the ESB:
Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 17.
118
Id.
119
See Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6, at 8–9
(discussing law school mismatch).
120
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 7–8.
121
Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6, at 8–10; see supra text
accompanying note 50 (acknowledging that the brief cited findings inconsistent with our
own).
122
Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6, at 10.
116
117
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According to [Sander and Taylor], a “growing volume of
very careful research, some of it completely unrebutted
by dissenting work” has found that affirmative-action
practices are not having their intended effect. . . . But, as
amici will show, the principal research on which Sander
and Taylor rely for their conclusion about the negative
effects of affirmative action—Sander’s so-called
“mismatch” hypothesis—is far from “unrebutted.”
Since Sander first published findings in support of a
“mismatch” in 2004, that research has been subjected to
wide-ranging criticism.123
“[T]hose relying on mismatch research mischaracterize the state of
social-science evidence and describe a consensus that does not exist.”124
The ESB further states, “[t]he Sander-Taylor Brief misrepresents the
acceptance of [Sander’s] hypothesis in the social-science community.”125
To prove these claims, the ESB quotes perhaps a dozen different
critiques on page after page—but in every case, these are critiques of lawschool mismatch. A very large proportion of the entire ESB is devoted to
demonstrating the existence of these critiques. This seems like a
pointless exercise, since there is no disagreement that the critiques exist.
But this really seems like an effort to hide the complete lack of substance
in the ESB argument. To see this point, consider this simple schematic of
the arguments. The Sander-Taylor brief argues: (1) there has been a
profusion of recent, careful social science research finding mismatch
effects;126 (2) critics have ignored the abundant evidence on science and
academic mismatch and focused their critiques on law school mismatch;
much of the research on mismatch, therefore, has been completely
unrebutted and unanswered.127 The ESB response is: (1) law school
mismatch dominates the mismatch debate so that is all we will address,
and we will pretend the rest of the research does not exist;128 (2) Sander
and Taylor outrageously claim that some mismatch research is
unrebutted.
What scoundrels they are—let us show you how
voluminously law school mismatch has been attacked.129 This tendency
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 8 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
Id. at 16.
125
Id. at 27.
126
See Brief for Sander & Taylor Supporting Neither Party, supra note 6, at 2, 5–10
(discussing studies that have found “science mismatch,” “academic mismatch,” and “lawschool mismatch”).
127
Id. at 7–8.
128
Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 9, at 17.
129
See id. at 8–10, 12–16 (providing examples of criticisms others have advanced).
123
124
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to blithely ignore the facts and construct more convenient straw men is
an ingrained habit among the mismatch critics, and it is one that makes
rational debate elusive.
IV. SILENCE
When I realized the scale of the errors in the ESB, I was of course
quite annoyed. But it also struck me as an opportunity. There were a
couple of extremists among the ESB authors, such as Richard Lempert,
whose feelings about affirmative action and mismatch were so
passionate that they would not particularly care whether they made
accurate attacks or not.130 But many of the signatories were, as they and I
have noted, eminent and respected social scientists. Surely some of them
had signed the brief merely out of friendship to the principal authors
and took on faith what these primary authors claimed about the
mismatch debate, not bothering too much with the details.131 It might be
possible to engage these scholars in a more honest discussion of the
mismatch question.
In the early summer of 2013, I contacted Thomas Leatherbury, a
respected attorney in Texas who was the counsel of record on the ESB—
meaning that he had been the author’s attorney for purposes of putting
the brief into proper legal form and making a timely filing with the
Supreme Court. Leatherbury was quite affable; he declined to tell me
who had been the principal authors of the brief, but was happy to pass
on to all the signatories any information I wanted to share. I then sent
him a letter detailing the clear mistakes at the core of the ESB and asking
for a retraction and apology.132 Leatherbury immediately acknowledged
receipt and promised to distribute the letter.133
130
Lempert, an emeritus law professor at the University of Michigan, has made a virtual
second career of attacking mismatch research in general and my work in particular, usually
in extremely tendentious and misleading terms. The ESB has all the hallmarks of a
Lempert attack. His efforts to upend the publication of my original article on law school
mismatch, and to prevent the California State Bar from making its data on legal education
and bar passage available to scholars, are detailed in SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 71–
75, 240–41.
131
Briefs are subject to special rules that essentially immunize their signatories from libel
suits, reducing the costs of signing onto briefs without checking out their factual accuracy.
See Protecting the First Amendment Right to Petition: Immunity for Defendants in Defamation
Actions Through Application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 147, 154–59
(1981) (discussing common law justifications for immunizing private defendants against
defamation claims).
132
See E-mail from Richard Sander to Thomas Leatherbury (July 19, 2013, 12:09 PM PDT)
(on file with author).
133
E-mail from Tom Leatherbury to Richard Sander (July 19, 2013, 12:13 PM PDT) (on file
with author).
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Then silence. After reading my letter, Leatherbury declined to
return later calls from me, perhaps feeling there was nothing he could
say that would be consistent with protecting his clients. None of the
signatories apologized. I reached out to some of them through
intermediaries, offering to have a public debate on the merits; they
declined.134
Notably, however, most of these signatories appear to have
withdrawn from the mismatch debate altogether. There was, for
example, no follow-up ESB submitted in response to the brief I
submitted in Schutte v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. It will be
interesting, someday, to learn who wrote the ESB and what exchanges
occurred among its signatories after they received my letter, or read this
article.
V. CONCLUSION
Many academic debates are hard for non-experts to evaluate, either
because the issues involved are complex and technical or because the
ultimate judgments of the protagonists are to some degree nuanced and
subjective. That is not the case here. The ESB’s central claims are simply
false, and anyone willing to spend a little time parsing the principal
documents involved can see this for themselves.135 The ESB hearkens
back to the early days of the debate over law school mismatch, when
affirmative action zealots dominated the discussion (and tended to
intimidate more moderate voices from entering the debate).136 Central to
the zealot’s strategy was to completely dismiss the mismatch hypothesis,
and thereby imply that anyone taking mismatch seriously was himself
suspect as a scholar. Sadly, this strategy almost worked. But the days
when discussion of the mismatch problem might be put back in a bottle
have long since passed.
Today, there is not only a very large literature on the mismatch
issue, with over two dozen serious scholars contributing to it; there is
also emerging a “discussion” literature, in which thoughtful scholars
who have expressed skepticism about mismatch are willingly engaging
134
For example, I reached out to Alexander Smith and invited Professor Kevin Quinn to
debate me at his home institution (Berkeley Law School) about mismatch. E-mail from
Richard Sander to Alexander Smith (Nov. 22, 2013, 2:52 PM PDT) (on file with author).
Smith passed along Quinn’s response: “Thanks for reaching out to me. I wish you the best
with this, but this is not something I’m interested in participating in.” E-mail from
Alexander Smith to Richard Sander (Nov. 25, 2013, 10:10 AM PDT) (on file with author).
135
For a list of the key documents in this area, see Papers and Studies, PROJECT SEAPHE,
http:://seaphe.org/?page-id=24 (last visited June 5, 2014).
136
See supra Part II (discussing the ESB). These points are developed in more detail in
SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at ch. 5.
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in careful discussion and debate about the research and its findings. For
example, the nation’s leading debate society, Intelligence Squared,
recently sponsored a debate at Harvard Law School (later rebroadcast on
NPR) that largely focused on the mismatch hypothesis.137 Malcolm
Gladwell’s most recent book, David and Goliath, has a chapter largely
dealing with the mismatch idea, in which Gladwell candidly discusses
his own intellectual evolution in thinking about the effects of admissions
preferences.138 The Journal of Economic Literature has commissioned an indepth review of the mismatch literature coauthored by a mismatch
skeptic and a mismatch proponent.139 And as part of its symposium on
Fisher, the Journal of Constitutional Law is publishing a dialog on the
contours and effects of racial preferences featuring two proponents of the
mismatch hypothesis and two skeptics.140
This is an enormously important development. As a thoughtful,
reasoned “center” emerges in empirical discussions of affirmative action,
the empiricism itself will tend to become more important in the larger
debate. And the sort of zealotry on display in the ESB will, increasingly,
be recognized for what it is—ideology wearing empirical makeup. Once
phony critiques are competing with thoughtful ones, they start to look
ridiculous—and it is being exposed as silly, rather than merely
erroneous, that will ultimately make the zealots fade away.

137
The debate featured Ted Shaw and Randall Kennedy arguing against the proposition
“Affirmative Action on Campus Does More Harm Than Good,” and Gail Heriot and I
arguing for the proposition. For the full debate video, see “Affirmative Action on Campus
Does More Harm Than Good,” INTELLIGENCE, http://intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/
past-debates/item/1054-affirmative-action-on-campus-does-more-harm-than-good
(last
visited June 5, 2014).
138
MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID AND GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS, AND THE ART OF
BATTLING GIANTS ch. 3 (2013).
139
Peter Arcidiacono & Michael Lovenheim, Affirmative Action and the Quality-Fit Tradeoff,
J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2014).
140
Peter Arcidiacono, Thomas Espenshade, Stacy Hawkins, & Richard Sander, A Dialog
on the Nature and Effects of Racial Preferences, 17 J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2014).
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